It is Mr. _Locke_'s Conclusion, at last, That WIT _consists in
something that is not perfectly conformable to Truth, and good
Reason_.--This is a _Problem_ of some Curiosity; and I apprehend
Mr. _Locke_'s Determination upon it to be right:--For the _Direction_
of WIT is absolutely different from the _Direction of_ TRUTH and GOOD
REASON; It being the Aim of WIT to strike the _Imagination_; of TRUTH
and GOOD REASON, to convince the _Judgment_: From thence they can
never be perfectly coincident.
It is however true, that there may be Instances of WIT, wherein the
_Agreement_ between the two Objects shall be absolutely _just_, and
perceived to be such at the first Glance. Such Instances of WIT, will
be then also _Self-evident_ TRUTHS. They will _both_ agree in their
obvious, and quick _Perspicuity_; but will be still different in this,
that the Effort of the _One_ is to strike the _Fancy_, whereas the
_Other_ is wholly exerted in gratifying the _Judgment_.
The Sentiments of Mr. _Addison_ upon WIT, are professedly delivered in
the _Spectator_ No. 62. annexed to the following _Essay_. He has there
justly commended Mr. _Locke_'s Description of WIT; but what he adds,
by Way of Explanation to it, that the _Assemblage_ of Ideas must be
such as shall give _Delight_, and _Surprize_, is not true, in regard
to the Former, _Delight_ being no _essential_ Property of WIT; for
if the _original_ Subject be unpleasant, or deformed, the sudden
unexpected _Arrangement_ of a _similar_ Object with it, may give us
_Surprize_, and be indisputably WIT, and yet be far from creating any
_Delight_.
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