49. But if we take a close and accurate view of things, it must be
acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object. That
which is seen is one thing, and that which is felt is another. If the
visible figure and extension be not the same with the tangible figure and
extension, we are not to infer that one and the same thing has divers
extensions. The true consequence is that the objects of sight and touch
are two distinct things. It may perhaps require some thought rightly to
conceive this distinction. And the difficulty seems not a little
increased, because the combination of visible ideas hath constantly the
same name as the combination of tangible ideas wherewith it is connected:
which doth of necessity arise from the use and end of language.
50. In order therefore to treat accurately and unconfusedly of vision, we
must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects apprehended by the
eye, the one primarily and immediately, the other secondarily and by
intervention of the former. Those of the first sort neither are, nor
appear to be, without the mind, or at any distance off; they may indeed
grow greater or smaller, more confused, or more clear, or more faint, but
they do not, cannot approach or recede from us. Whenever we say an object
is at a distance, whenever we say it draws near, or goes farther off, we
must always mean it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the
touch, and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the eye in like
manner as thoughts by the ear.
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