And we may sometimes perceive colours
where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth make it manifest that
no man, at first receiving of his sight, would know there was any
agreement between this or that particular object of his sight and any
object of touch he had been already acquainted with: the colours,
therefore, of the head would to him no more suggest the idea of head than
they would the idea of foot.
104. Farther, we have at large shown (VID. sect. 63 and 64) there is no
discoverable necessary connexion between any given visible magnitude and
any one particular tangible magnitude; but that it is entirely the result
of custom and experience, and depends on foreign and accidental
circumstances that we can by the perception of visible extension inform
ourselves what may be the extension of any tangible object connected with
it. Hence it is certain that neither the visible magnitude of head or
foot would bring along with them into the mind, at first opening of the
eyes, the respective tangible magnitudes of those parts.
105. By the foregoing section it is plain the visible figure of any part
of the body hath no necessary connexion with the tangible figure thereof,
so as at first sight to suggest it to the mind. For figure is the
termination of magnitude; whence it follows that no visible magnitude
having in its own nature an aptness to suggest any one particular
tangible magnitude, so neither can any visible figure be inseparably
connected with its corresponding tangible figure: so as of itself and in
a way prior to experience, it might suggest it to the understanding.
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