Again, the ideas of sight enter into
the mind several at once, more distinct and unmingled than is usual in
the other senses beside the touch. Sounds, for example, perceived at the
same instant, are apt to coalesce, if I may so say, into one sound: but
we can perceive at the same time great variety of visible objects, very
separate and distinct from each other. Now tangible extension being made
up of several distinct coexistent parts, we may hence gather another
reason that may dispose us to imagine a likeness or an analogy between
the immediate objects of sight and touch. But nothing, certainly, doth
more contribute to blend and confound them together than the strict and
close connexion they have with each other. We cannot open our eyes but
the ideas of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by
them. So swift and sudden and unperceived is the transition from visible
to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the
immediate object of vision.
146. The prejudice which is grounded on these, and whatever other causes
may be assigned thereof, sticks so fast that it is impossible without
obstinate striving and labour of the mind to get entirely clear of it.
But then the reluctancy we find in rejecting any opinion can be no
argument of its truth to whoever considers what has been already shown
with regard to the prejudices we entertain concerning the distance,
magnitude, and situation of objects; prejudices so familiar to our minds,
so confirmed and inveterate, as they will hardly give way to the clearest
demonstration.
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