152. It is therefore plain that visible figure are of the same use in
geometry that words are: and the one may as well be accounted the object
of that science as the other, neither of them being otherwise concerned
therein than as they represent or suggest to the mind the particular
tangible figures connected with them. There is indeed this difference
between the signification of tangible figures by visible figures, and of
ideas by words: that whereas the latter is variable and uncertain,
depending altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men, the former is
fixed and immutably the same in all times and places. A visible square,
for instance, suggests to the mind the same tangible figure in Europe
that it doth in America. Hence it is that the voice of the Author of'
Nature which speaks to our eyes, is not liable to that misinterpretation
and ambiguity that languages of human contrivance are unavoidably subject
to.
153. Though what has been said may suffice to show what ought to be
determined with relation to the object of geometry, I shall nevertheless,
for the fuller illustration thereof, consider the case of an
intelligence, or unbodied spirit, which is supposed to see perfectly
well, i.e. to have a clear perception of the proper and immediate objects
of sight, but to have no sense of touch.
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