But though they are called by
the same names with the things marked by them, they are nevertheless of a
nature entirely different, as hath been demonstrated.
159. What hath been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to decide the
question we proposed to examine, concerning the ability of a pure spirit,
such as we have described, to know GEOMETRY. It is, indeed, no easy
matter for us to enter precisely into the thoughts of such an
intelligence, because we cannot without great pains cleverly separate and
disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of sight from those of
touch which are connected with them. This, indeed, in a complete degree
seems scarce possible to be performed: which will not seem strange to us
if we consider how hard it is for anyone to hear the words of his native
language pronounced in his ears without understanding them. Though he
endeavour to disunite the meaning from the sound, it will nevertheless
intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find it extreme difficult, if not
impossible, to put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that
never learned the language, so as to be affected barely with the sounds
themselves, and not perceive the signification annexed to them.
160. By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither abstract nor
visible extension makes the object of geometry; the not discerning of
which may perhaps have created some difficulty and useless labour in
mathematics.
Pages:
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120