V. In his dealings with his fellow-citizens he is more to be praised
as an enemy than as a friend; for he would not act unjustly to injure
his enemies, but he sometimes disregarded justice in the interests of
his friends. He was of too generous a nature to refrain from
applauding even his enemies when they deserved it, but could not bear
to reproach his friends for their faults, which he delighted to share
with them, and to extricate them from the consequences, for he thought
nothing disgraceful if done to serve a friend.[174] He was also ever
ready to forgive and assist those with whom he had been at variance,
and thus won all hearts, and attained to a true popularity. The Ephors
indeed, perceiving this, imposed a fine upon him, alleging as a reason
for it that he was attaching the Spartans to his own person instead of
to the State. For just as physical philosophers tell us that if the
principle of strife and opposition were removed, the heavenly bodies
would stand still, and all the productive power of nature would be at
an end, so did the Laconian lawgiver endeavour to quicken the virtue
of his citizens by constructing a constitution out of opposing
elements, deeming that success is barren when there is none to resist,
and that the harmonious working of a political system is valueless if
purchased by the suppression of any important element. Some have
thought that the germ of this idea can be traced in Homer,[175] for he
would not have represented Agamemnon as rejoicing when Achilles and
Odysseus quarrel 'with savage words,' had he not thought that some
great public benefit would arise from this opposition and rivalry of
the bravest.
Pages:
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245