On the third day he had already embarked at his leisure
all the troops with the exception of those who were guarding the
walls, to whom he suddenly gave a signal, upon which they all ran down
quickly and being taken on board got out to sea. When Caesar saw the
walls deserted, he concluded that the enemy were making off, and in
his pursuit of them he narrowly escaped getting involved among the
stakes and trenches; but as the people of Brundisium gave him warning,
he avoided the city and, making a circuit round it, he found that all
had got under sail, except two vessels which contained only a few
soldiers.
LXIII. Now everybody else reckons the sailing away of Pompeius among
the best military stratagems, but Caesar[347] wondered that Pompeius,
who was in possession of a strong city and was expecting his troops
from Iberia and was master of the sea, should desert and abandon
Italy. Cicero[348] also blames Pompeius for imitating the generalship
of Themistokles rather than that of Perikles, the circumstances being
like those of Perikles and not those of Themistokles. And Caesar showed
by what he did that he was greatly afraid of time:[349] for when he
had taken prisoner Numerius, a friend of Pompeius, he sent him to
Brundisium with instructions to bring about a reconciliation on fair
terms; but Numerius sailed off with Pompeius. Upon this Caesar, who in
sixty days had become master of Italy without shedding any blood, was
desirous of pursuing Pompeius immediately, but as he had no vessels,
he turned about and marched to Iberia with the design of gaining over
the troops there.
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