But Pompeius did not consider it to be
consistent with his reputation to run away from Caesar a second time
and to be pursued, when fortune gave him the opportunity of being the
pursuer, nor did he think it consistent with his duty to desert
Scipio[362] and the consular men in Hellas and Thessaly who would
immediately fall into Caesar's hands with their military chests and
large forces; he thought also that Rome was best cared for by fighting
in her defence as far from her as possible, that she might wait for
the conqueror without feeling or hearing of any misfortunes.
LXVII. Having come to this decision, Pompeius pursued Caesar, resolved
to avoid a battle, but by following close up to hem him in and wear
him out by privation. He had other reasons for thinking this to be the
best plan, and it also reached his ears that it was a subject of
common conversation among the cavalry that they ought to defeat Caesar
as soon as they could and then put down Pompeius also. Some say that
this was also the reason why Pompeius employed Cato[363] in no matter
of importance, but even when he was marching against Caesar left him on
the coast to look after the stores, through fear that if Caesar were
destroyed, Cato might forthwith compel him also to lay down his
command. Accordingly as he followed the enemy leisurely he was much
censured and there was a clamour against him, that his object was not
to defeat Caesar by his generalship, but his native country and the
Senate, that he might always keep the command and never give over
having as his attendants and guards those who considered themselves
the masters of the world.
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