But the advice which he gave Pompeius before, and gave Scipio then,
not to fight with a man of a warlike turn and great ability, but to
take advantage of time which wastes all the vigour wherein the
strength of tyranny lies, Scipio through self-will despised; and on
one occasion he wrote to Cato upbraiding him with cowardice, in that
he was not content to sit down within a city and walls, but would not
even let others boldly use their own judgment as opportunity offered.
To this Cato replied, that he was ready to take the legionary soldiers
and horsemen whom he had brought into Libya, and carry them over to
Italy, and so make Caesar change his place and to turn him from them to
himself. And when Scipio mocked at this also, it was clear that Cato
was much annoyed that he had declined the command, for he saw that
Scipio would neither conduct the war well, nor, if he should succeed
contrary to expectation, would he behave with moderation to the
citizens in his victory. Accordingly Cato formed the opinion and
mentioned it to some of his friends, that he had no good hopes of the
war on account of the inexperience and confidence of the commanders,
but if there should be any good fortune, and Caesar should be worsted,
he would not stay in Rome, and would fly from the harshness and
cruelty of Scipio, who was even then uttering dreadful and extravagant
threats against many. But it turned out worse than he expected; and
late in the evening there arrived a messenger from the camp who had
been three days on the road, with the news that a great battle had
been fought at Thapsus[750] in which their affairs were entirely
ruined, that Caesar was in possession of the camps, Scipio and Juba had
escaped with a few men, and the rest of the army was destroyed.
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